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This Concept Map, created with IHMC CmapTools, has information related to: Debate_complete_Stern-review-Climate-economics, there is no necessary relation between the antecedent and the consequent. While the antecedent conditions are all based on assump- tions that can be criticized, the consequent is a factual statement defeats (M.H.) if we use the PAGE2002 IAM, and if "The parameter ranges used as model inputs are calibrated to the scientific and economic literatures on climate change," and if we apply a discount rate of 1.4%, then business as usual will lead to costs of 5 to 20% "of the value of global per-capita consumption, now and forever" (144), the standard practice in applied economics to first transform "both consumption (proportional to future GDP) and welfare losses (from climate harm) ... into utility," and then further aggregate, discount, and compare this utility at the margin, does not have a "straightforward link to anything real in the world. Rather, it represents a hypothetical valuation of possible future worlds associated with some policy scenario, integrating the perceived likelihood of different possibilities with the presumed desirability of those possibilities. As such, it is a kind of judgment that can reasonably be expected to differ among different persons, and indeed the SR discusses the kinds of disagreements that might be expected to lead to different estimations of the value (expected utility) of a particular scenario. The idea that even a single individual could have a well-defined view of the expected utility of an uncertain future is open to serious question. As discussed, such projections involve addressing not merely processes that are well understood but uncertain (in a probabilistic sense), but processes about which we are at least partially ignorant, or which are indeterminate due to human choice. ... Thus, strong uncertainty must be reduced to weak uncertainty but such a move simultaneously undercuts the robustness of the resulting calculations." (Baer-Spash, 182-3 objects we use the PAGE2002 IAM (Stern 2006e, 153), "A related feature of the Review’s near-zero time discount rate is that it puts present decisions on a hair-trigger in response to farfuture contingencies. Under conventional discounting, contingencies many centuries ahead have a tiny weight in today’s decisions. Decisions focus on the near future. With the Review’s discounting procedure, by contrast, present decisions become extremely sensitive to uncertain events in the distant future." (696) e.g. "We saw above how an infinitesimal impact on the post-2200 income stream could justify a large consumption sacrifice today. We can use the same example to illustrate how farfuture uncertainties are magnified by low discount rates. Suppose that the climatic wrinkle is not a sure thing; rather, there is a 10 percent probability of a wrinkle that would reduce the post-2200 income stream by 0.1 percent. What insurance premium would be justified today to reduce that probability to zero? With conventional discount rates, and one might say with common sense, we would ignore any tiny low-probability wrinkle two centuries ahead. With the Review’s near-zero discount rate, offsetting the low-probability wrinkle would be enormously valuable. We would pay an insurance premium today of as much as 8 percent of one year’s consumption (about $4 trillion) to remove the year-2200 contingency. If the contingency were thought to occur in 2400 rather than 2200, the insurance premium would still be 6.5 percent of one year’s income. Because the future is so greatly magnified by a near-zero time discount rate, policies would be virtually identical for different threshold dates. Moreover, a small refinement in the probability estimate would trigger a large change in the dollar premium. If someone discovered that the probability was 15 percent rather than 10 percent, the insurance premium would rise by almost $2 trillion." (697), it is morally unnacceptable to outsource the damages resulting from climate change to the developing countries therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: MH) life-threatening effects should not be the only criterion for climate policies, there is a contradiction between this caveat and the reason in the main argument (top left): While this reason is formulated as a factual statement, it could only be justified as a possibility based on the caution formulted here. objects (M.H.) "such models must make drastic, often heroic, simplifications along all stages of the climate- change chain. What is more, large uncertainties are associated with each element in the cycle. Nevertheless, the IAMs remain the best tool available for estimating aggregate quantitative global costs and risks of climate change." (Stern 2006e, 145), "a high rate of discounting of the future will favour avoiding the costs of reducing emissions now, since the gains from a safer and better climate in the future are a long way off and heavily discounted (and vice versa for low discount rates)." (45) suppports if "the welfare of future generations should be treated on a par with our own" (5), then we should apply a low discount rate of pure time preference of 0.1%, if the Stern Review uses "a preference utilitarian framework where costs and benefits are measured as changes in consumption" only, and if goods such as human lives and environ- mental quality are incommensurable with income and consumption, then Stern's cost-benefit analysis is an unsuitable tool for generating climate policy recommendations therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Spash, 708) Stern's cost-benefit analysis is an unsuitable tool for generating climate policy recommendations, it is possible that in the future "large parts of the population lose interest in economic goods and turn to ascetic pursuits, or where rich nations use higher productivity to develop fiendish new weapons, or where people come to love the altered landscape of the warmer world" (693) supports we do not know the preferences of future generations (693), "Generally, poor countries, and poor people in any given country, suffer the most, notwithstanding that the rich countries are responsible for the bulk of past emissions." (Stern 2006b, 28) supports developing countries are much more effected by climate change than the developed countries, "the welfare of future generations should be treated on a par with our own" (5) therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Stern 2006d (2) we should apply a low discount rate of pure time preference of 0.1%, "How much society should spend on abatement depends upon climate damages. If climate change is likely to destroy our way of life, society should devote large sums of money for abatement. If the effects of climate change are mild, however, society needs to choose a more moderate path. Over a decade of research on climate impacts has determined that only the following sectors of the economy are sensitive to climate change: agriculture, forestry, water, energy, and coastal resources (Pearce 1996; IPCC 2001b). These sectors make up about 5 percent of developed country economies and between 10 and 40 percent of developing country economies." (50) supports developing countries are much more effected by climate change than the developed countries, if "the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting," then "prompt and strong action is clearly warranted" ... "to avoid the worst impacts of climate change" therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Stern 2006a, vi) "prompt and strong action is clearly warranted" ... "to avoid the worst impacts of climate change", "Estimating those costs is essential for taking action (although we have emphasised strongly the dangers of taking them too literally)." (Stern 2006e, 145) defeats if "CBA was developed to evaluate well–defined smallscale projects," and if "even at such a project level there is often scepticism relating to the necessary simplifications and assumptions," then cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an unsuitable tool for generating climate policy recommendations, life-threatening effects should not be the only criterion for climate policies objects if "Delaying aggressive programs into the future costs much less," and if there is no life- threatening danger at the moment, then dangerous global temperature levels can be avoided much more cost-effectively through targeting 650 to 950 ppm CO2e, "such models [Integrated Assessment Models] must make drastic, often heroic, simplifications along all stages of the climate- change chain. What is more, large uncertainties are associated with each element in the cycle. Nevertheless, the IAMs remain the best tool available for estimating aggregate quantitative global costs and risks of climate change." (Stern 2006e, 145) objects the practice of discounting ignores the fact that "different [climate] scenarios imply different rates, even in theory, which makes the rate endogenous to the climate change problem and its policy ‘solution’." (174), a widely shared consensus in the "study of intertemporal efficiency in climate-change policy": "One of the major findings in the economics of climate change has been that [this is] efficient or “optimal” economic policies.... We might call this the climate- policy ramp, in which policies to slow global warming in- creasingly tighten or ramp up over time." "All economic studies find a case for imposing immediate re- straints on greenhouse gas emissions, but the difficult questions are how much and how fast." (687) supports we should target "modest rates of emissions reductions in the near term, followed by sharp reductions in the medium and long term", "This means that it runs each scenario many times (e.g. 1000 times), each time choosing a set of uncertain parameters randomly from pre-determined ranges of possible values. In this way, the model generates a probability distribution of results rather than just a single point estimate. Specifically, it yields a probability distribution of future income under climate change, where climate-driven damage and the cost of adapting to climate change are subtracted from a baseline GDP growth projection" (Stern 2006e, 153) defines PAGE2002 IAM "meets this requirement by producing estimates based on ‘Monte Carlo’ simulation", if developing countries are much more effected by climate change than the developed countries, and if it is morally unnacceptable to outsource the damages resulting from climate change to the developing countries, then life-threatening effects should not be the only criterion for climate policies therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: MH) life-threatening effects should not be the only criterion for climate policies, this is not true. Even though there might be no "objective" probabi- ty distribution, and even though the PAGE2002 model produces only an "opinion," such an opinion is neverthe- less useful defeats (M.H.) if "Human induced climate change holds the prospect of large-scale unique changes outside human historical experience," then "The standard scientific approach of repeated experiments to produce an ‘objective’ probability distribution is ... of no practicable use." (175-6), this principle is "related to the idea of the rights of future generations" note (Stern 2006c) "future generations should have a right to a standard of living no lower than the current one." (42)